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On State Reconstruction in Nepal 
 
Jeevan Raj Sharma 
 
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) led a decade long (1996-2006) armed 
insurgency against the Nepali state. With the peace agreement signed in 2006, after 
nearly eleven years of the insurgency, Nepal is currently going through an intense process 
of state reconstruction. The old constitution and the 250-year-old monarchy have been 
cut off but the new constitution and the new political system is yet to be established. The 
Constitutional Assembly, following the elections in April 2008, is set with the task of 
writing the new constitution by addressing a number grievances raised by various identity 
groups. A long list of immediate issues facing the Nepali state in the current liminal 
phase include: the integration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), continuing 
violence and lack of state control in the Terai, ongoing impunity and lack of 
accountability, provision of justice and reparation for victims of the conflict, agitation by 
ethnic groups, recognition and inclusion of historically marginalised groups, political 
contests over the shape of federalism in the new State, transformation of the Maoists into 
a democratic force, re-establishment of a peaceful political process and the 
democratization of state institutions. Perhaps Gramsci’s words best explain the current 
state of Nepal: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born. In this interregnum, there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms.”  
The spread of the Maoist rebellion in Nepal has led to a growing scholarship and analysis 
on causes, complexities and the prescriptions to address the issues raised by it. There is a 
tendency within the current dominant discourses to attribute the causes of the revolution 
to  ‘internal’ political, cultural or economic reasons, and the solution proposed have been 
in line with this diagnosis.  The most common diagnosis relates to a narrative of state 
failure in which the nature and causes of crises have been attributed to state’s inability to 
democratise social relations and political authority, failure to provide basic services 
despite decades of development aid and widespread corruption. Consequently the current 
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debate on state reconstruction includes issues of ethnic and regional federalism, 
affirmative action, inclusive state, people’s democracy and addressing the grievances of 
identity groups among others. But this may be only a partial explanation. What if the 
causes of grievances and current political crises are far broader than those proposed by 
the ‘state failure’ discourses? What if the causes of the political crises in Nepal stretch 
beyond the borders of Nepal? Perhaps there is a fundamental problem in the way the 
causes of the Maoist insurgency and associated grievances are understood and are being 
addressed in the current context of state reconstruction.  
In the following paragraphs, I make three points on why explanations for the Maoist 
insurgency and associated crises should be understood beyond Nepal’s borders. I argue 
that the armed revolt and a meaningful process of state reconstruction in the Himalayan 
country must include a broader analysis on Nepal’s integration into the broader processes 
of globalization, felt primarily through the economic and political dominance of the 
Indian state. One can read the current crisis as a consequence of the incorporation of the 
Himalayan borderlands into the broader global processes. This incorporation, and the 
tensions that it created, have contributed to the armed rebellion, widespread out-
migration, radical movements associated with ethnic and regional identity among others. 
In conclusion, I will argue that the crises in this Himalayan borderland should not only be 
attributed to failure of the Nepali state but also with a particular lens of analysis that 
ignores factors that lie outside Nepal. I thus challenge mainstream explanations for 
failing to comprehend the broader framework and nature and of the Nepali state and state 
reconstruction. At this point, I must make it clear that I am not saying that ‘internal 
factors’ such as historical marginalization and structural and cultural violence are not 
important. I fully agree that these ‘internal factors’ played an important role in the spread 
of the Maoist insurgency and long-standing grievances in Nepal. My argument is that an 
over-emphasis on these ‘internal factors’ with a systematic ignorance of ‘external factors’ 
characterizes current debates on state and its reconstruction in Nepal. This has obvious 
implications for the future. 
 
I 
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It is a paradox that while the implications of global processes, and Indian expansionism 
can be felt in the everyday life of Nepali population, the long-standing issues relating to 
Nepal’s sovereignty, dependence and integration do not get serious analytical attention in 
the current debate on state reconstruction. Let me discuss three points on why the 
political crises associated with Maoist revolt and grievances raised by the population 
must be viewed beyond Nepal’s borders.  
First, let us consider some of my interactions as a part of my larger research with the 
Maoist fighters. In my interviews (#32) with Maoist fighters on experiences of joining the 
insurgency, almost all did not just talk about ‘torture’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘lack of 
livelihood opportunities’ but put equal emphasis on ‘protecting Nepal’s border’ from 
India. To name a few, their grievances included ‘border encroachment’ by India, 
‘unequal treaties imposed by India’, ‘pollution of Nepali culture by foreign culture and 
Indian cinema’, ‘destruction of Nepali industries with Indian goods’, ‘influence of 
foreign power in Nepal’, ‘migration of Nepali workers abroad and brain/labor drain’.  In 
their narratives, there was sense of loss of Nepali culture, self-reliance and sovereignty. 
Consequently, these young men and women saw their participation in the insurgency as a 
resistance to preserve their culture, politics and economy against Indian and global 
expansion. Their experience in the insurgency included digging bunkers in the Nepal-
India border, border march from the Mechi (Eastern border of Nepal) to Mahakali 
(Western border of Nepal), rejecting Indian movies in cinemas and chanting/wall-
painting anti-India slogans at the event of perceived Indian dominance. Against such 
lived experience and sentiments, it is difficult to attribute these narratives only to political 
indoctrination. Desire to fight for the protection of Nepal remained a consistent theme in 
my interactions with these young men and women. 
Likewise, anti-India sentiment is neither a new phenomenon in Nepal nor it is limited to 
Maoists or other political parties. Anti-India sentiment or grievances against India can be 
regularly observed in Nepali media, street demonstrations and informal everyday 
discussions among large sections of Nepali population. These grievances are rooted in the 
psychology of a small insecure landlocked state surrounded by India on the South, East 
and West. The anti-India sentiment is so intense that it is often important for many 
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Nepalis to blame India to demonstrate one’s commitment to the nation. Despite that there 
are strong cultural, trade and migration links between the two countries, the sanction 
imposed by India in 1989 on Nepal and the hardship it caused to the general Nepali 
population, and discrimination faced by Nepali migrants, pilgrims and travelers in India 
explains the hostility towards the Indian state. All these very clearly demonstrate the 
impact of geo-politics on the lived experiences of Nepalis and the grievances, real and 
perceived, against the Indian expansion. 
Second, let us look at the list of demands (grievances) presented by the Maoists before 
they went for armed revolt. The Maoist agenda were reflected in the 40-point demand 
submitted on 4 February 1996 to the then Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba; the 
demands were organised into three thematic concerns- ‘nationality’ (1-9), ‘people’s 
democracy’ (10-26) and ‘people’s livelihoods’ (27-40).  The Maoist insurgency was not 
only built around an agenda that attacked the feudal nature of Nepali society and the 
structural violence inherent in it, but also on the issue of state sovereignty and Nepal’s 
ubiquitous dependent relationship with India.  Likewise, the Maoists did appear hostile to 
the idea of foreign aid and the presence of INGOs operating in Nepal at least at the initial 
stage of the insurgency. However, it appears that the Maoist themselves have abandoned 
the demands relating to nationality once they signed the 12 point agreement in New 
Delhi. Since then these demands have been excluded from the Maoist agenda, and it 
appears that they are not even discussed in the current debate on state reconstruction. Just 
because the Maoists have abandoned these issues, primarily for pragmatic reasons, does 
not mean that these issues are not relevant in the current process of state reconstruction in 
Nepal. Issues of sovereignty appear perhaps more important than ever when we have a 
situation where aid actors and international agencies directly shape the current debate on 
state reconstruction and constitution writing by pouring millions of dollars through 
several projects. Likewise, ubiquitous role of India in shaping the everyday political 
processes in Nepal is regularly reported in the media. 
Third, I won’t be making a novel argument when I say that Nepal has been historically 
dependent on India. Based on their earlier research work in western central Nepal in 70s, 
British social scientists Piers Blaikie and colleagues predicted a crisis in Nepal and 
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argued that the development of capitalism in Nepal is effectively precluded by Nepal’s 
relationship with India, its own class structures and the nature of the Nepali state. The 
expansion of Indian economic processes have effectively disabled the economy and 
disempowered the economic agency of hill population.  
 
In contrast to its northern neighbor, Nepal and India share a 1751 kilometer open border 
which was formalised by the Nepal-India Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950. Possibly 
there are two reasons why neither the colonial regime in India nor Nepali rulers showed 
much interest in controlling the border. First, it facilitates the flow of cheap labour from 
Nepal into India. Second, it facilitates the flow of raw materials from Nepal into India 
and, in reverse, the flow of commodities and goods manufactured in India into the Nepali 
market. 
 
A few statistical facts may help us think more towards the significance of external factors 
in Nepali state and its reconstruction. First, about 3-4 million Nepalis (out of 30 million) 
live outside of Nepal and appear to actively participate in the debate on state 
reconstruction through various networks and mobilisations. Second, migrant remittances 
tranfered through official channels alone contributes to about 18 per cent of Nepal’s 
GDP. I would estimate that the actual contribution of remittances may be as much as 30 
per cent of Nepal’s GDP. Third, foreign aid contributes upto 74 per cent of Nepal’s 
development budget (or 27 per cent of the total budget).  What might these mean for the 
current debate on state reconstruction? 
 
 
II 
In order to understand why ‘internal’ factors dominate the existing analysis on Maoist 
rebellion and current debates on state reconstruction, we must interrogate the actors that 
play a key role in producing and brokering knowledge on Nepal. To do so, I invite 
analysts and social scientists to interrogate two sets of actors: existing scholarship and 
development aid actors on Nepal.  
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There is a tendency within the academic scholarship to view Nepal as a bounded unit 
with very little analysis on how this region relates to the wider world. Though social 
scientists in principle agree that it is important to look at global processes and how they 
influence local and vice-versa, there has been very little attempt to analyse the nature of 
Nepali state and current process of state reconstruction from a regional or global 
perspective. There is a strong tendency in the scholarship to view life in the hills of Nepal 
largely as a discrete and timeless society unaffected by the outside world. What 
anthropologist Liisa Malkki calls ‘sedentary bias’ appears to shape the scholarly work on 
Nepal. Until 1990s, anthropologists, who played a key role in producing knowledge on 
Nepal, preferred to write detailed ethnographies of different ethnic groups; only recently 
they have begun to pay attention to state-society relations. However, there has been 
hardly any serious attempt to situate the social and political processes in Nepal within the 
regional analysis of the Himalayan borderland. One possibility is to take inspiration from 
the work of James Scott in South East Asia and study the crises in Nepal as a part of 
larger processes of incorporation of the Himalayan borderland within Indian expansion. 
Ignoring this dimension is a bit like ignoring the elephant in the room. 
Through their ‘expertise’ and ‘influence’, aid actors and associated actors play a 
significant role in producing knowledge on state and state reconstruction in Nepal. They 
appear to hold an assumption that a nation state is bounded and so must be the unit of 
analysis, planning and interventions. Following the epistemology of bounded nation state 
and their (non) political position, their analysis always focuses on ‘internal factors’ 
simultaneously ignoring ‘external’ factors that shape the politics and political processes 
in Nepal.  They hold an implicit assumption that state reconstruction in Nepal is an 
internal affair. Missing the ‘external factors’ that shape the Nepali state may not be 
ignorance but a more or less conscious political choice made by the aid actors working on 
Nepal. 
To conclude, the scholarship on state and state reconstruction in Nepal must incorporate a 
geo-political analysis on the integration of the Himalayan region into the broader 
economic, political and cultural processes of Indian expansion and globalization. I argue 
that ignoring the ‘outside’ of Nepal has serious consequences, not only because so much 
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of what happens in Nepal is determined by the outside strategic geopolitical interests, but 
also because the diasporas and remittances play a critical role in shaping of the 
reconstruction of Nepal. Failure to address these factors may be read as a political choice 
made by current scholarship towards designing a particular nature of Nepali state that 
continues to remain a weak one. A meaningful state reconstruction must include 
significant transformation in Nepal’s current relationship with India and the wider world. 
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